

KEY NEGOTIATION ASPECTS OF COOPERATIVE APPROACHES UNDER ARTICLE 6.2





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SUMMARY

This policy note provides practical guidance for host countries engaging in bilateral cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement. Its purpose is to support countries in negotiating cooperation that reflects national priorities, maintains control over mitigation outcomes, and can be implemented in line with UNFCCC reporting and accounting requirements.

The note focuses on three interconnected negotiation domains that form the foundation of Article 6.2 implementation:

- Activity cycle design and authorization procedures, which define how mitigation activities move from approval to monitoring, verification, issuance, and transfer, and establish the timing and governance structure for key decisions. Early bilateral agreements—such as Ghana–Switzerland, Chile–Singapore, and other bilateral agreements—demonstrate the importance of clear approval pathways and transparent authorization processes.
- Standards, methodologies, and integrity requirements, which determine how mitigation outcomes are quantified, monitored, verified, and safeguarded for environmental and social integrity. The Singapore Article 6.2 Crediting Protocol, as well as provisions in a number of bilateral cooperation arrangements, highlight the centrality of conservative baselines, robust additionality tests, safeguards, and ITMO labeling/traceability requirements.
- Coordination of UNFCCC reporting and accounting, which underpins transparency, avoidance of double counting, and accurate corresponding adjustments. Bilateral experiences show that aligned data flows, consistent application of accounting metrics, and interoperability between registries are essential for credible reporting and timely transfers. Examples drawn from multiple bilateral cooperation frameworks illustrate how structured data flows support efficient reporting.

These domains are mutually dependent: procedural decisions shape methodological feasibility and reporting timelines; methodological choices determine the data needed for tracking and accounting; and reporting frameworks require consistency across procedures and standards. Addressing them as a coherent package strengthens national control, reduces integrity and accounting risks, and supports long-term climate strategies.

From a host-country perspective, these negotiation domains also determine the extent to which cooperation can deliver strategic value, protect mitigation potential, and reinforce national climate and development priorities. Emphasizing these elements ensures that cooperative approaches not only meet readiness and compliance requirements but also maximize the benefits that host countries can derive from Article 6.2 cooperation.

A central part of this host-country perspective is the articulation of national interests and priorities, ensuring that countries define priority sectors, protect NDC achievement, and set value and participation expectations ahead of negotiations.

The note concludes with practical recommendations for enhancing negotiation readiness, including the development of model templates, cross-ministerial coordination mechanisms, sectoral and risk assessments, and targeted capacity-building for technical teams and negotiators—all critical elements reflected in the experience of early Article 6.2 cooperation.

Early bilateral experiences—including Ghana–Switzerland and Switzerland–Thailand, as well as lessons emerging from other bilateral agreements—demonstrate that procedural clarity, methodological rigor, and synchronized reporting and accounting arrangements form the foundation of credible cooperation.

INTRODUCTION

Cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement offer host countries a strategic opportunity to mobilize investment, accelerate mitigation, and strengthen progress toward their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). By enabling the international transfer of mitigation outcomes, Article 6.2 can channel finance into priority sectors, support technological transformation, and reinforce long-term decarbonization strategies. At the same time, the design of these approaches brings significant responsibilities: host countries must safeguard environmental integrity, protect domestic mitigation potential, and ensure full consistency with the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF).

Experience from early implementers—such as Switzerland, Ghana, and Senegal—and emerging experiences from a range of bilateral cooperation arrangements show that Article 6.2 cooperation is technically complex and requires coordinated decisions across governance structures, methodological frameworks, and data and registry systems. Recent UNFCCC Article 6.2 guidance (Decision 2/CMA.3 and the 2025 updates) underscores that countries must establish clear arrangements for authorization, tracking, reporting, and accounting prior to operationalizing cooperation. These arrangements directly influence national monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems, inventory processes, institutional roles, and long-term mitigation pathways. Examples from these bilateral cooperation arrangements show how flexible bilateral approaches can still align with ETF requirements when registry and MRV roles are clearly defined.

This Policy Note examines three negotiation topics that are central to establishing credible and effective cooperative approaches under Article 6.2:

1. Activity cycle design and authorization procedures,
2. Standards, methodologies, and integrity requirements, and
3. Coordination of UNFCCC reporting and accounting.

Analysis of bilateral agreements demonstrate that these elements operate as an integrated system: procedural choices influence methodological feasibility and reporting timelines; methodological decisions determine the data required for tracking and accounting; and reporting frameworks rely on consistent application of procedures and standards. Addressing these domains together enables host countries to negotiate cooperative approaches that safeguard national interests, ensure transparency, and support long-term climate ambition.

However, beyond technical readiness, host countries must approach Article 6.2 negotiations with a clear definition of their national priorities. Negotiations shape the extent to which cooperation aligns with domestic development strategies, preserves sovereign control over mitigation outcomes, and secures long-term mitigation potential. The articulation of national interests and priorities—including sector selection, co-benefits, retention strategies, and value expectations—is therefore central to ensuring that cooperation aligns with long-term domestic planning. This

framing strengthens bargaining power and ensures cooperation is structured around national interests.

1 ENSURING NATIONAL INTERESTS AND PRIORITIES

For host countries, engaging in cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 is not only a technical exercise but a strategic negotiation process that should reinforce national climate priorities, safeguard long-term mitigation potential, and generate clear domestic benefits. Defining national interests early ensures that cooperation supports—not constrains—long-term decarbonization pathways and broader development objectives.

A first strategic consideration is the identification of priority sectors and mitigation activities. The bilateral agreements between Ghana–Switzerland, and other Article 6.2 cooperation frameworks illustrate this approach: these frameworks require that mitigation activities align with national low-emission development strategies, consider existing and planned policies, and avoid practices incompatible with long-term climate goals. These provisions provide host countries with a foundation to authorize only those activities that reinforce national mitigation pathways.

Sustainable development impacts and co-benefits are also central to prioritization. The Peru–Switzerland agreement and several other cooperation arrangements require activities to avoid negative environmental and social impacts while contributing positively to national development priorities. Similarly, the Chile–Singapore agreement empowers a Joint Committee to assess whether proposed mitigation activities align with each Party’s domestic safeguards frameworks before granting authorization, and comparable procedural safeguards appear in other bilateral models. Embedding these considerations ensures that Article 6.2 cooperation supports resilience, social outcomes, and national development strategies.

Host countries must also clarify how much mitigation to retain domestically to ensure NDC achievement. Provisions in the Ghana–Switzerland agreement and other partner-country arrangements requiring additionality, conservative baselines, and compatibility with long-term strategies help countries evaluate whether the authorization of certain volumes could undermine future mitigation needs. The Switzerland–Thailand agreement reinforces this approach, and further clarity is provided in other Article 6.2 cooperation experiences, which similarly anchor authorization decisions in national planning.

Another key national interest is ensuring that cooperation generates predictable economic value. While the allocation of revenue inside the country is a domestic matter¹, host countries can integrate upstream price safeguards, minimum value expectations, or participation conditions that help secure fair compensation for high-integrity mitigation outcomes. The Singapore Article 6.2 Crediting Protocol provides an example of how traceability, labeling, and methodological discipline can help countries position their mitigation outcomes in higher-value markets, and elements of this approach also appear in other bilateral arrangements exploring structured

¹ The allocation of revenue within the host country is a domestic matter and generally falls outside the scope of bilateral Article 6.2 negotiations. However, establishing price expectations or minimum value conditions can help ensure that cooperation delivers predictable and fair economic returns.

commercial terms. Establishing such conditions strengthens host-country negotiating power without regulating internal revenue distribution.

Together, these elements provide a strategic foundation for Article 6.2 negotiations. By defining priority sectors, aligning activities with long-term planning, retaining sufficient mitigation to achieve the NDC, and setting value expectations for cooperation, host countries can negotiate bilateral agreements that reinforce domestic objectives and maintain sovereign control over mitigation potential.

2 INTERLINKAGES BETWEEN THE THREE NEGOTIATION TOPICS

Effective bilateral cooperation under Article 6.2 requires aligning the three core negotiation domains—activity-cycle procedures, standards and methodological choices, and UNFCCC reporting and accounting—so they function as a single, coherent architecture. UNFCCC guidance (Decision 2/CMA.3 and subsequent updates) underscores that procedural steps, methodological parameters, and accounting rules jointly determine the information needed for transparent reporting and the application of corresponding adjustments. A coordinated negotiation approach helps avoid inconsistencies, streamline implementation, and reinforce environmental integrity.

2.1 Activity-cycle decisions shape the timing and quality of information required for methodologies and reporting

While the broad sequencing of an activity cycle—authorization, monitoring, verification, issuance, and transfer—remains structurally similar across bilateral agreements, specific procedural choices strongly influence when information becomes available for reporting. Examples from agreements such as Chile–Singapore and Switzerland–Thailand illustrate how authorization timing, first-transfer rules, and review steps define when verification outputs are generated and how they feed into Initial Reports, Annual Information, and Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs).

Other cooperation frameworks, including Singapore–Vietnam, show how early authorization and structured review processes help ensure that methodologies and safeguards are applied consistently before monitoring begins. These variations demonstrate how activity-cycle design directly affects reporting readiness and data reliability.

2.2 Standards and methodological choices establish the information that must be generated for tracking, reporting, and corresponding adjustments

Methodological elements—such as baselines, additionality, monitoring requirements, and safeguards—determine which data must be collected. Their effectiveness depends on a prior negotiation decision regarding the standards to be used, whether domestic systems, Independent Crediting Programs (ICPs), or hybrid approaches.

UNFCCC Decision 2/CMA.3 defines what information Parties must report, but clear standards and procedures are what enable that information to be produced consistently in practice. For example, the Singapore–Vietnam agreement uses an eligibility process for crediting programs and methodologies, ensuring that only mitigation outcomes meeting integrity requirements enter the activity cycle. Similarly, frameworks such as Switzerland–Senegal apply safeguard and methodological checks that reinforce alignment with reporting obligations.

Thus, methodologies define the content of data, while the choice of standards shapes the overall architecture through which that data is generated, verified, and communicated.

2.3 Reporting and accounting frameworks depend on aligned procedures and consistent methodological rules

Corresponding adjustments, avoidance of double counting, and multi-year accounting all require tight alignment between activity-cycle steps and methodological provisions. Misaligned verification periods, unclear unit attributes, or inconsistent authorization timing can create discrepancies in BTR tables or trigger findings during the Article 6 Technical Expert Review.

The Switzerland–Thailand agreement demonstrates the need for registry events, labels, and authorization metadata to align precisely for accounting purposes. Likewise, cooperation models such as Zambia–Sweden and Singapore–Vietnam incorporate structured verification cycles and publication requirements to ensure that both Parties’ registries and transparency submissions remain synchronized.

2.4 Negotiating these topics cohesively strengthens national interests and reduces risks

Treating activity-cycle, methodological, and accounting rules in isolation can lead to inconsistencies, delays, and integrity risks. An integrated negotiation strategy ensures that methodological requirements match institutional capacity, procedural milestones align with reporting timelines, and safeguards apply across all stages of implementation.

Early bilateral experiences—including Switzerland–Senegal and Peru–Switzerland—show that when these domains are negotiated as a coherent package, countries are better able to protect mitigation potential, maintain credible reporting, avoid double counting, and strengthen long-term cooperation under Article 6.2.

3 ACTIVITY CYCLE AND AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES

A well-defined activity cycle is fundamental for host countries to retain strategic control over cooperative approaches under Article 6.2. It establishes how mitigation activities are identified, assessed, authorized, monitored, verified, issued, and transferred as ITMOs. Clear procedures enhance predictability for partners, enable effective oversight, and generate the information

required for Article 6.2 reporting and accounting under UNFCCC Decision 2/CMA.3 and subsequent updates.

3.1 Relevance for host-country control, predictability, and operational clarity

Activity-cycle decisions determine *when* and *how* a host country exercises oversight, thereby influencing the integrity of both mitigation outcomes and transfers. UNFCCC Article 6.2 guidance requires Parties to demonstrate transparent authorization processes, verification arrangements, and alignment between transfers and NDC trajectories, making procedural clarity central to compliance.

A review of bilateral practice illustrates this clearly:

- In Switzerland–Senegal, authorization is a mandatory prior step before monitoring and verification may begin, with requirements to publish authorizations and updates in national registries to secure traceability.
- The Singapore–Vietnam agreement structures authorization sequencing through a Joint Committee that coordinates timing with first-transfer events, aligning registry records with verification outcomes.
- Other cooperation frameworks, such as Zambia–Sweden, embed review stages that link monitoring and issuance steps to reporting deadlines, reinforcing predictable implementation.

These examples demonstrate shared design principles—early authorization, structured review steps, and registry publication—even if the institutional arrangements differ across agreements.

3.2 Core negotiation issues

Designing Article 6 cooperative approaches requires early agreement on a set of core procedural and institutional elements that determine how activities will be approved, authorized, and managed over time. These elements shape the predictability, administrative efficiency, and environmental integrity of the cooperation framework. Experience from existing bilateral agreements—such as Ghana–Switzerland, Chile–Singapore, Singapore–Vietnam, and Switzerland–Thailand—shows that clarity in approval pathways, authorization timing, and institutional roles is essential for reducing transaction costs and providing investors with a stable operating environment.

- **Approval steps.** Negotiators must define whether approval follows a multi-step pathway—such as MADD/DDAM² submission, completeness checks, activity authorization, and subsequent authorization of mitigation outcomes—or a streamlined approach.

² 'MADD' refers to the Mitigation Activity Design Document, as used in the Ghana–Switzerland bilateral agreement under Article 6. Similarly, 'DDAM' corresponds to the Spanish term Documento de Diseño de Actividad de Mitigación, used in the Peru–Switzerland agreement, which is the direct Spanish equivalent of MADD.

Several agreements, including Ghana–Switzerland and Chile–Singapore, show how standardized templates and clear review responsibilities help reduce administrative friction and strengthen investor confidence.

- **Authorization timing and scope.** UNFCCC guidance requires explicit authorization of the cooperative approach, mitigation outcomes, and participating entities. Negotiation issues include whether authorization is granted early (pre-registration), conditionally, or in phases.

In Ghana–Switzerland, authorizations include methodologies, monitoring requirements, authorized volumes, and participating entities—providing a comprehensive reference for implementation. The Singapore–Vietnam framework similarly links authorizations to crediting periods and eligible methodologies. In the Switzerland–Thailand cooperation, authorization is tied directly to the “first transfer” event to ensure synchronization with reporting and accounting obligations.

- **Institutional arrangements.** Institutional structures vary across agreements. Some, such as Singapore–Vietnam, rely on joint bodies with authority to approve activities, review methodological consistency, and coordinate registry functions. Others, such as Zambia–Sweden and Switzerland–Senegal, use authority-to-authority channels where each Party publishes authorizations and verification documents independently. The Chile–Singapore arrangement incorporates coordinated review processes without requiring a fully joint institution.

These institutional differences show that successful structures may be centralized or bilateral, as long as roles and decision-making authorities are clearly defined.

3.3 Implications for host-country implementation frameworks

Bilateral activity-cycle provisions shape domestic implementation systems in several ways:

- **Institutional architecture.** DNAs, MRV units, sector agencies, inventory teams, and registry administrators require clear mandates. Agreements such as Switzerland–Senegal illustrate how publishing authorizations and verification outputs strengthens transparency and coordination.
- **Technical systems.** MRV processes, data flows, and registries must align with authorization milestones and verification timelines. Cooperation models such as Singapore–Vietnam emphasize registry linkage with crediting programs, underscoring the need for interoperable data systems.
- **NDC alignment.** Approval and transfer of mitigation outcomes must remain consistent with national mitigation strategies. Arrangements like Ghana–Switzerland and Switzerland–Thailand include provisions to avoid activities that conflict with national long-term planning.

- **Transparency.** Agreements such as Peru–Switzerland require publication of authorizations, verification results, and related documents. This transparency supports predictable implementation and simplifies UNFCCC reporting.

These elements collectively determine readiness to operationalize Article 6.2 while minimizing risks such as overselling, inconsistent reporting, or transfer delays.

3.4 Strategic recommendations for negotiation positions

Building on lessons from existing bilateral cooperation agreements and emerging UNFCCC guidance, Parties can strengthen their negotiation positions by adopting structured, transparent, and integrity-focused approaches to activity approval and authorization. Effective negotiation strategies should balance the need for administrative efficiency with safeguards that protect mitigation ambition, ensure alignment with national priorities, and maintain full sovereignty over Article 6 participation.

- **Adopt structured, time-bound approval processes.** Clear templates, completeness checks, and defined timelines—building on practices seen across several agreements—can significantly enhance administrative efficiency.
- **Balance authorization flexibility with due diligence.** Authorizations should be grounded in robust assessments of NDC alignment, methodological soundness, and sustainable development safeguards. Phased or conditional authorization models used in some agreements can support this balance.
- **Introduce bilateral review steps selectively.** Pre-issuance reviews or consistency checks can strengthen integrity while avoiding unnecessary procedural burdens.
- **Ensure compatibility with registry and reporting systems.** Authorization and transfer events must correspond to registry functionalities and UNFCCC reporting requirements. Approaches that synchronize authorization with first transfers—seen in several agreements—can enhance traceability.
- **Preserve host-country sovereignty.** Activity-cycle design should maintain the host country’s authority to approve, limit, or revoke participation; manage transfer volumes; and safeguard long-term mitigation potential.

4 STANDARDS, METHODOLOGIES, AND INTEGRITY REQUIREMENTS

Standards and methodologies are central to ensuring that mitigation outcomes transferred under Article 6.2 are real, verified, additional, conservative, and compatible with national and UNFCCC reporting and accounting requirements. They shape how mitigation outcomes are quantified, monitored, verified, and attributed, and determine whether cooperation contributes to global

mitigation without undermining host-country NDC achievement. Negotiating methodological provisions is therefore essential for safeguarding environmental integrity and ensuring that mitigation outcomes can be transparently reported and adjusted in line with Article 6.2 guidance.

4.1 Importance of methodological alignment for integrity and credibility

High-integrity methodological frameworks underpin ITMO credibility and trust in bilateral cooperation. UNFCCC Decision 2/CMA.3 establishes the core integrity requirements for mitigation outcomes and the information Parties must report. The World Bank (2020) highlights that unit quality and NDC stringency jointly determine environmental integrity, warning that weak baselines or insufficient additionality can lead to over-crediting. The TNC (2025) analysis reinforces the expectation for transparent baseline justification, safeguards, and compatibility with accounting rules.

Bilateral agreements also embed integrity principles:

- Ghana–Switzerland and Switzerland–Senegal require baselines to be conservative, aligned with national low-emission development strategies, and free from negative environmental or social impacts.
- The Singapore–Vietnam agreement requires mitigation outcomes to comply with pre-approved methodologies consistent with Article 6.2 and establishes a structured process for maintaining eligible standards.
- The Zambia–Sweden framework includes strict requirements for verification reports, baseline consistency, and safeguards aligned with national policies.

Together, these provisions show how methodological alignment reinforces transparency, reporting consistency, and environmental integrity.

4.2 Key negotiation elements

4.2.1. Choice of standards (international, domestic, or hybrid)

A central methodological negotiation decision is which standard(s) will govern baselines, monitoring, additionality assessments, and safeguards. This may include internationally recognized standards (e.g., Verra, Gold Standard, ART/TREES), domestic standards, or hybrid models involving Independent Crediting Programs (ICPs). The Singapore Article 6.2 Crediting Protocol illustrates how ICPs apply the ‘Authorized’ label to credits, manage verification processes, and ensure traceability between crediting program registries and national Article 6 registries.

Examples from bilateral agreements demonstrate the range of approaches in practice. The Singapore–Vietnam agreement uses a Joint Committee to maintain a list of eligible crediting programs and methodologies. Likewise, the Chile–Singapore agreement relies on standards referenced directly in their authorizations, which specify applied methodologies, monitoring

requirements, and verification procedures. These arrangements illustrate how the choice of standard—rather than any individual methodological parameter—becomes the anchor for baseline design, additionality rules, monitoring protocols, and safeguard requirements.

4.2.2. Baseline setting aligned with NDC trajectories

Baseline design is one of the most sensitive elements of methodological negotiations. Baselines must be conservative, consistent with NDC trajectories and sectoral strategies, avoid generating “hot air,” and remain compatible with long-term mitigation pathways. Bilateral experiences underscore this: the Ghana–Switzerland and Zambia–Sweden agreements require explicit consideration of existing and planned national policies and the use of conservative assumptions, while the Switzerland–Thailand agreement ensures baseline alignment through methodological consistency reviews conducted during activity assessment. These practices help ensure that baselines reflect real mitigation potential and do not undermine national decarbonization trajectories.

4.2.3. Additionality and eligibility conditions

Additionality rules determine whether mitigation outcomes go beyond what would have occurred under prevailing policies and economic conditions. Examples from the Singapore–Vietnam and Switzerland–Senegal agreements show how additionality assessments incorporate evolving sectoral regulations, policy reforms, and national mitigation strategies. By anchoring additionality in national planning and requiring developers to account for policy evolution, these agreements help safeguard long-term mitigation potential and reduce integrity risks associated with over-crediting.

4.2.4. Sustainable development (SD) requirements and safeguards

Sustainable development provisions and safeguards often exceed the minimum requirements established under the UNFCCC Article 6.2 guidance. The Chile–Singapore and Zambia–Sweden agreements illustrate how environmental and social safeguards—including stakeholder engagement, risk screening, and monitoring of SD co-benefits—are embedded across the mitigation activity cycle.

T-VER (Thailand’s domestic standard) requires project developers to submit a Sustainable Development and Safeguards Assessment and a Sustainable Development Report, including environmental and social indicators and screening of potential risks. This approach aligns with Thailand’s safeguard verification procedures under Article 6 and can be reflected in bilateral negotiations involving Thai participation, as demonstrated in the Switzerland–Thailand agreement. The Zambia–Sweden framework similarly integrates sustainability reporting requirements into its verification cycle, reinforcing the importance of safeguards for activity approval and issuance.

4.3 Implications for alignment with national MRV systems and NDC strategies

Methodological choices must align with national MRV structures and sectoral mitigation planning. ICAT (2023) stresses the importance of methodologies generating data that can be integrated into GHG inventories and Article 13 reporting. Alignment considerations include:

- **MRV readiness and inventory consistency.** MRV systems must capture activity-level data and verification outputs in formats that can be integrated into national inventories. Mismatches between project-level data and the national GHG inventory increase the risk of overselling, as discrepancies may result in over-transfer of mitigation outcomes or gaps in applying corresponding adjustments. Experiences such as the Peru–Switzerland agreement show how verification outputs and registry entries can be structured to ensure compatibility between project-level data and national inventories.
- **NDC consistency checks.** Baselines and methodologies must support assessments of whether activities safeguard future mitigation potential and remain consistent with national pathways. The Ghana–**Switzerland** and Switzerland–Senegal agreements illustrate how baseline justification and policy screening reinforce consistency with NDC trajectories.
- **Registry integration.** Metrics, vintages, gases covered, and monitoring periods must be compatible with registry requirements for tracking authorizations, issuances, transfers, and cancellations. The Chile–Singapore and Zambia–Sweden agreements demonstrate how registry metadata and unit attributes can be aligned to support interoperability and traceability.
- **Sector planning.** Methodological decisions must reinforce long-term mitigation strategies rather than lock in emissions-intensive practices. The Switzerland–Thailand agreement shows how methodological **conditions** can enhance alignment with sectoral decarbonization strategies and avoid technology lock-in.

4.4 Strategic recommendations for negotiating methodological provisions

Methodological provisions form the backbone of credible, transparent, and policy-aligned Article 6 cooperation. They determine how mitigation outcomes are quantified, how baselines and additionality are assessed, and how activities interface with national MRV systems and UNFCCC reporting requirements. As Parties negotiate these elements, methodological choices must balance rigor with practicality—ensuring environmental integrity while remaining feasible within domestic technical and institutional capacities.

- **Prioritize methodologies consistent with national policies and technical capacities.** The focus should be on selecting standards and methodological approaches that reflect sectoral conditions and domestic MRV capabilities.

- **Adopt conservative baseline principles linked to NDC and sector strategies.** Baselines should be justified transparently, aligned with national trajectories, and periodically updated to avoid generating non-additional mitigation outcomes.
- **Embed strong additionality and safeguard requirements.** This includes integrating SD frameworks and safeguards into activity approval processes, consistent with practices demonstrated in the bilateral agreements and with domestic systems like T-VER in Thailand.
- **Ensure that the selected standards and methodological approaches generate the technical information required for UNFCCC Article 6.2 reporting and accounting.** Measurement and monitoring rules must produce quantified mitigation outcomes, associated vintages, gases covered, and baseline and monitoring parameters in formats that can feed directly into registry records and subsequently populate the Initial Report, Annual Information (via the Agreed Electronic Format), and BTR tables.
- **Maintain flexibility for methodological evolution as sectors decarbonize.** Negotiations should enable transitions toward more stringent or sector-specific methodologies as policy frameworks and national strategies evolve.

5 COORDINATION OF UNFCCC REPORTING AND ACCOUNTING

Reporting and accounting arrangements are a cornerstone of cooperative approaches under Article 6.2. They ensure that mitigation outcomes are transparently generated, authorized, transferred, used, and adjusted, and that these processes remain aligned with national NDC trajectories. Embedding clear reporting and accounting provisions in bilateral agreements strengthens credibility, supports compliance under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), and helps manage long-term mitigation strategies. UNFCCC Article 6.2 guidance (Decision 2/CMA.3 and subsequent updates) emphasizes the need for accurate, consistent, and synchronized reporting between cooperating Parties.

5.1 Importance of avoiding double counting and ensuring compliance

Under Article 6.2, Parties must report—through Initial Reports, Annual Information, and Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs)—how ITMOs were authorized, generated, first transferred, used, and adjusted. Any inconsistencies between Parties may trigger findings during the Article 6 Technical Expert Review (TER), which can delay transfers or require corrective actions. World Bank (2020) stresses that conservative, transparent accounting frameworks reduce methodological and reporting risks, while TNC (2025) notes that recent COP decisions have made these obligations more prescriptive.

5.2 Core negotiation issues

5.2.1. Information-sharing arrangements and data flows

Bilateral cooperation requires synchronized data flows across the activity cycle. Negotiations must define:

- Which entities provide data (project participants, verifiers, DNAs, MRV units, ICPs, registries),
- How data is validated and exchanged,
- Timelines and formats for reporting.

The Singapore Article 6.2 Crediting Protocol illustrates how ICPs structure monitoring and verification data so that registry entries can be populated accurately. However, ultimate responsibility for reporting remains with the Parties. The Switzerland–Senegal and Zambia–Sweden agreements all include procedures for sharing authorization information, verification outputs, issuance events, and transfer records between Parties to support synchronized reporting.

5.2.2. Accounting metrics, vintages, and unit attributes

UNFCCC guidance requires mitigation outcomes to be reported in tCO₂e or other NDC-consistent metrics, including information on vintages, gases, and attributes. Identifiers must follow UNFCCC

nomenclature and data structuring requirements. Negotiations must therefore define applicable metrics, conversion rules for non-GHG metrics, accounting-period relationships, and treatment of multiple credit types. The Ghana–Switzerland agreement provides examples of how vintages, unit attributes, and gas-level information are structured to align with UNFCCC reporting formats.

5.2.3. Corresponding adjustment (CA) procedures

CAs are technically demanding. Negotiations must define timing, accounting approach, registry recording, BTR appearance, and corrective measures. ICAT (2023) stresses consistency with ETF requirements, national inventories, and NDC tracking frameworks. The Singapore–Vietnam agreement operationalizes CA application explicitly upon first transfer, while the Switzerland–Thailand and Peru–Switzerland agreements specify how authorizations define NDC eligibility periods for adjustments.

5.2.4. Registry functions and interoperability

Registries must track authorizations, issuances, transfers, cancellations, and acquisitions using UNFCCC-compliant metadata. Interoperability between registries, interaction with the UNFCCC Article 6 database, and compatibility with ICP systems are essential. The Singapore Protocol demonstrates how registry alignment—including ITMO tagging and serial-number traceability—supports accurate reporting. For example, the Zambia–Sweden agreement processes transfers through coordinated cancellation-and-reissuance steps where registries are not interoperable, while the Chile–Singapore agreement illustrates how registry linkages can support direct transfer, tagging, and metadata alignment.

Examples from the Singapore Article 6.2 Crediting Protocol: How Registry Alignment Supports Accurate Accounting

The Singapore Article 6.2 Crediting Protocol (2024–2025) illustrates how interoperability between Independent Crediting Programs (ICPs) and the national registry enables transparent reporting and reliable corresponding adjustments under Article 6.2. Key examples include:

- **Unique unit identifiers across systems:** ICP-issued mitigation outcomes retain the same serial number when transferred to Singapore’s registry, ensuring full traceability and preventing double counting.
- **Harmonized recording of the “first transfer”:** Both registries must record the first transfer with identical information (volume, date, IDs, LOA reference). This alignment is essential because the first transfer triggers the corresponding adjustment process.
- **LOA–registry linkage:** Article 6.2 labels (ITMO tagging) can be applied only when a valid Letter of Authorization exists. Registry entries must mirror LOA metadata, ensuring only authorized units are eligible for transfer or adjustment.
- **Common unit attributes:** Metrics, vintages, activity identifiers, and monitoring periods must match across ICP and national registries, allowing accurate population of Initial Reports, Annual Information, and BTR tables
- **Synchronized cancellation for NDC use:** When units are used toward Singapore’s NDC, both registries must record identical cancellation events, avoiding double claiming and ensuring CA consistency.

Together, these mechanisms demonstrate how aligned registry events and shared data structures provide the backbone for transparent tracking and high-integrity accounting under Article 6.2.

5.3 Implications for registry readiness, data systems, and institutional coordination

Reporting and accounting provisions in bilateral agreements have broad domestic implications:

- **Registry readiness.** National registries must be able to apply CA logic, track authorizations, and record issuance and transfers consistently with UNFCCC metadata requirements.
- **Data governance.** Systems must reconcile data from verification reports, methodologies, sector agencies, ICPs, and national registries. Misaligned data structures can lead to inconsistencies in Annual Information submissions or CA tables.
- **Institutional roles.** DNAs, MRV units, inventory teams, and registry administrators must coordinate tightly to ensure that all reporting inputs are consistent before submission to the UNFCCC.

- **Technical capacity.** As highlighted in GGGI (2023) and ICAT (2023), many countries need strengthened capacities in GHG inventory management, accounting methodologies, registry operation, and interoperability.
- **Procedural alignment.** The activity cycle must generate timely and complete data that is consistent across domestic documentation, ICP outputs, and bilateral records—reducing risk of discrepancies during TER review.

5.4 Strategic recommendations for harmonizing reporting and accounting

Effective cooperation under Article 6.2 depends on the ability of participating Parties to generate consistent, interoperable, and accurate reporting and accounting information. Differences in data structures, registry capabilities, authorization formats, and timing of corresponding adjustments can create misalignments that complicate UNFCCC reporting and increase the risk of discrepancies during technical expert reviews.

To mitigate these challenges, Parties can adopt practical strategies that streamline data sharing, standardize accounting practices, and ensure coherence between bilateral operations and UNFCCC requirements. Key recommendations below aimed at strengthening transparency and consistency across reporting systems, supporting robust accounting, and facilitating smooth registry coordination even when full interoperability is not yet achievable.

- **Negotiate structured data-sharing protocols and standardized templates.** Templates for authorizations, verification summaries, issuance notices, and transfer records reduce inconsistencies and help synchronize reporting across Parties.
- **Ensure alignment on accounting metrics and multi-year accounting approaches.** Both Parties must apply the same accounting metrics, CA timing, and methodological choices to avoid discrepancies in BTR tables.
- **Embed registry interoperability requirements in bilateral agreements when feasible, recognizing that not all registries can yet communicate directly.** The Switzerland–Thailand model of cancellation and re-issuance illustrates alternative pathways when full interoperability is not possible.
- **Ensure that issuance requests are structured to support UNFCCC Article 6.2 reporting.** Under Article 6.2, what is reflected in Annual Information, the Agreed Electronic Format (AEF), and subsequently in BTR tables is the issuance—and the related authorization and transfer entries—recorded in national registries.
- **Establish clear procedures for error correction and reconciliation.** Defined processes for resolving discrepancies—such as mismatched unit identifiers, incorrect CA entries, or erroneous issuance events—strengthen accounting credibility and reduce risks during the Article 6 Technical Expert Review.

6 CROSS-CUTTING IMPLICATIONS FOR HOST COUNTRIES' IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORKS

Activity-cycle procedures, methodological provisions, and reporting and accounting requirements under Article 6.2 have broad implications for national implementation frameworks. These elements interact with domestic governance structures, MRV and registry systems, sectoral policies, and NDC strategies. UNFCCC Decision 2/CMA.3 and subsequent updates highlight the need for Parties to have arrangements in place for authorization, tracking, reporting, and the application of corresponding adjustments before operationalizing cooperative approaches. Early experiences from the Switzerland–Senegal and Chile–Singapore agreements show that strong cross-cutting systems are essential for effective negotiation and implementation.

6.1 Governance coordination, institutional roles, and legal considerations

Implementing Article 6.2 requires coordinated action across climate policy units, sector ministries, MRV bodies, registry administrators, inventory teams, and legal departments. UNFCCC guidance emphasizes the need for clear institutional arrangements that can issue authorizations, maintain tracking systems, and ensure NDC consistency.

Examples illustrate different governance models:

- The Singapore–Vietnam agreement establishes a Joint Committee with clear mandates for activity authorization, methodological oversight, and registry coordination.
- The Zambia–Sweden agreement defines national authority-to-authority pathways with explicit responsibilities for publishing authorizations, verification approvals, and registry entries.
- The Switzerland–Senegal agreement implements coordinated procedures for verifying monitoring reports, approving issuance, and reflecting transfers.

Effective governance frameworks should include:

- A clearly mandated national authority responsible for issuing authorizations, overseeing participation, and communicating with partner countries.
- Inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms linking climate policy, MRV systems, registry management, sector agencies, and legal units.
- Legal provisions regulating participation conditions, authorization procedures, data governance, safeguards, and corrective measures.
- Public guidelines and standardized procedures to enhance predictability and reduce transaction costs for developers.

6.2 Required capacities for MRV, registries, and long-term oversight

Each of the Article 6.2 negotiation domains creates specific capacity needs. Methodological choices establish data requirements, activity-cycle procedures define when data must be produced, and reporting and accounting rules determine how information must be integrated into national systems. Rather than focusing solely on initial readiness gaps, long-term implementation requires sustained oversight and periodic review of cooperative and bilateral agreements. Priority capacity areas include:

- **MRV systems**
 - Collection of activity-level data, including baselines, monitoring indicators, and verification results.
 - Oversight of independent verification processes.
 - Integration of project-level data with national GHG inventory systems to avoid inconsistencies that could lead to overselling or incorrect application of corresponding adjustments.
- **Registry management**
 - Application of UNFCCC-compliant serial identifiers and metadata.
 - Tracking of authorizations, issuances, first transfers, and cancellations.
 - Ensuring compatibility with the UNFCCC Article 6 registry infrastructure (including CARP) and, where relevant, with ICP registries.
- **Accounting and transparency**
 - Expertise in inventory management, NDC tracking, vintages, and multi-year accounting approaches.
 - Ability to prepare Initial Reports, Annual Information, and BTR disclosures consistent with the UNFCCC Agreed Electronic Format.
- **Long-term bilateral oversight**
 - Regular review of methodological updates, safeguard requirements, and baseline revisions.
 - Monitoring compliance with authorizations and activity-cycle requirements through joint or coordinated systems.
 - Periodic review of bilateral agreements to ensure alignment with evolving national policies, updated methodologies, and changes in NDC trajectories.

Countries that lack sustained oversight capacity risk inconsistencies in reporting, delays in transfers, and findings during the Article 6 Technical Expert Review.

6.3 Alignment with national climate priorities, sectoral planning, and long-term strategies

Cooperative approaches should reinforce national mitigation pathways rather than undermine them. Baseline and monitoring methodologies, additionality requirements, and authorization decisions directly influence the volume, timing, and sectoral distribution of ITMO supply.

Key alignment considerations include:

- **Sector prioritization.** Identifying sectors capable of generating ITMOs without jeopardizing domestic mitigation needs, including safeguarding priority areas for NDC achievement.
- **Policy coherence.** Ensuring that methodological decisions reflect current regulations, policy reforms, and technological trajectories.
- **Long-term mitigation potential.** Avoiding baselines or additionality provisions that lock in emissions-intensive technologies or constrain long-term decarbonization. The World Bank (2020) notes that weak alignment with national planning can lead to overselling or stranded mitigation potential.
- **Sustainable development and just transition.** Safeguards and SD provisions should support national development goals and protect communities.

7 PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING NEGOTIATION READINESS

Strengthening negotiation readiness is essential for host countries seeking to engage strategically and effectively in bilateral cooperative approaches under Article 6.2. Readiness spans legal, institutional, technical, and strategic dimensions. Guidance from UNFCCC Article 6.2 decisions and analytical work by GGGI, ICAT, the World Bank, and TNC underscores the importance of structured preparation, coordination mechanisms, and robust technical capacity. Experiences from early bilateral cooperation—such as the Zambia–Sweden agreement—reinforce that readiness is a decisive factor for successful implementation.

7.1 Develop model clauses and structured negotiation templates

Model templates accelerate negotiations, reduce ambiguity, and ensure consistency with national and international requirements. Host countries should develop:

- Model Letters of Authorization (LOAs) aligned with UNFCCC reporting requirements and structured to support registry and tracking needs, as reflected in the Singapore Article 6.2 Crediting Protocol.

- Standardized Mitigation Activity Design Documents, aligned with domestic MRV systems and methodological provisions.
- Model clauses for corresponding adjustments, covering accounting approaches, timing, registry entries, and reconciliation.
- Standard information-exchange templates, reflecting UNFCCC guidance and the practices seen in the Chile–Singapore and Switzerland–Senegal agreements.

7.2 Establish internal coordination mechanisms for legal and technical review

Effective negotiation requires coherent positions across government actors. GGGI (2023) identifies weak inter-institutional coordination as a common barrier to implementation readiness.

Countries should establish:

- A designated national authority or focal point with a clear mandate to issue authorizations, coordinate technical assessments, and interface with partner countries.
- A cross-ministerial Article 6 working group linking climate policy units, MRV and inventory teams, sectoral ministries, registry administrators, and legal departments.
- Internal review protocols for assessing methodological choices, baselines, additionality, safeguards, and NDC alignment.
- Decision-making procedures ensuring coherence between technical analysis, legal requirements, and negotiation strategy.

Examples from the Singapore–Vietnam Joint Committee and the authority-to-authority pathways in the Zambia–Sweden and Switzerland–Thailand agreements illustrate how coordination enhances readiness and leverage.

7.3 Conduct assessments of mitigation potential, sectoral eligibility, and risks

Negotiation positions should be grounded in rigorous analysis of national mitigation potential and sector-specific dynamics. Key assessments include:

- Sectoral mitigation potential analyses, identifying which areas can supply ITMOs without compromising domestic mitigation needs—an approach consistent with World Bank (2020) and ICAT (2023).
- Baseline and additionality risk assessments, considering policy evolution and methodological sensitivities.
- Overselling risk assessments, drawing on guidance regarding NDC trajectories and mitigation pathways from World Bank (2020) and TNC (2025).
- Safeguard and sustainable development risk mapping, building on provisions in the Singapore–Vietnam, Switzerland–Senegal, and Zambia–Sweden agreements.

- Long-term mitigation potential assessments, ensuring cooperation does not constrain future decarbonization.

These assessments help define negotiation boundaries, sector eligibility criteria, and limitations on authorized volumes.

7.4 Implement targeted capacity-building for negotiators and technical teams

Article 6.2 negotiations demand legal, methodological, accounting, and policy expertise. Capacity-building should be systematic, iterative, and aligned with real implementation needs, focusing on:

- Article 6.2 rules, accounting approaches, and reporting obligations under UNFCCC decisions (2/CMA.3; ETF guidance).
- MRV and registry operation, including vintages, unit attributes, and corresponding adjustment logic—areas identified by GGGI (2023).
- International standards and Independent Crediting Programs (ICPs), particularly their rules for baselines, additionality, monitoring, verification, and ITMO tagging, as reflected in the Singapore Protocol.
- Simulation exercises or mock negotiations, informed by practical lessons from the Chile–Singapore, Peru–Switzerland, and Zambia–Sweden agreements and other early movers.
- Engagement with ICPs, to understand labeling, verification requirements, traceability, and registry integration pathways.

Strengthening these capacities positions host countries to safeguard national interests and negotiate cooperation aligned with long-term climate and development priorities.

8 CONCLUSION

Designing cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 requires host countries to negotiate a coherent package of provisions spanning the activity cycle, methodological requirements, and UNFCCC reporting and accounting. UNFCCC Article 6.2 decisions (2/CMA.3 and subsequent updates), together with analyses from the World Bank (2020), GGGI (2023), ICAT (2023), and TNC (2025), emphasize that these domains are interdependent and must be treated as an integrated system to maintain environmental integrity and alignment with NDC trajectories.

Bilateral experiences—including the Switzerland–Senegal and Zambia–Sweden agreements, among others—demonstrate that procedural clarity, methodological rigor, and synchronized reporting and accounting arrangements form the foundation of credible cooperation. These agreements highlight the importance of aligning authorization timing, baseline and additionality requirements, safeguard provisions, data flows, registry functions, and corresponding adjustment procedures from the outset.

An integrated negotiation approach enables host countries to protect mitigation potential, maintain consistency with national strategies, and implement cooperation under transparent and robust rules. Decisions on authorization, baseline design, additionality criteria, sustainable development safeguards, information-sharing arrangements, and accounting methodologies should be treated as mutually reinforcing elements that determine the overall integrity and effectiveness of cooperative approaches.

Strengthening negotiation readiness—through cross-ministerial coordination mechanisms, model templates, sectoral and risk assessments, and targeted capacity-building—positions host countries to engage confidently in bilateral cooperation aligned with national climate and development priorities. Experiences from early movers and the guidance reflected in the Singapore Article 6.2 Crediting Protocol demonstrate that readiness is a decisive factor for successful implementation.

As countries move toward operationalizing Article 6.2 at scale, the imperative is clear: negotiate high-integrity, integrated frameworks that reinforce national objectives, ensure credible accounting, and support long-term climate ambition. When designed and negotiated strategically, cooperative approaches can mobilize finance, accelerate mitigation, and strengthen the foundations for low-emission development. Integrating national-interest considerations—such as strategic sector selection, protection of NDC trajectories, and clear value expectations—into this negotiation process further strengthens host-country bargaining power and ensures that cooperation under Article 6.2 delivers durable domestic benefits while advancing broader sustainable development goals.

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